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FROM BLACKSTONE TO BENTHAM: 
COMMON LAW VERSUS LEGISLATION IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 
James Oldham* 
THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN. By David Lieberman. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 1989. Pp xiii, 312. $44.50. 
In his History of English Law, Sir. William Holdsworth writes: 
The fact that during the eighteenth century, the courts were able to con-
solidate and to settle the principles of the modem law; and the fact that 
they were able to settle the relations of common law and equity ... were 
due largely to the freedom with which they were able to develop their 
principles unimpeded by legislative interferences.1 
David Lieberman's excellent book, The Province of Legislation De-
termined, gives us a basis for understanding and evaluating Holds-
worth's proposition. Lieberman thoughtfully analyzes major 
eighteenth-century legal personalities in order to illuminate the world 
in which Jeremy Bentham became a strident spokesman for the legis-
lative process. This is a recapture mission, accomplished not through 
documentary foraging, but through the content of printed sources, 
some of which had slipped into the fog of distant time. Although Lie-
berman displays an impressive array of scarce sources, the writings of 
his main objects of study - Blackstone, Mansfield, Karnes, and Ben-
tham - are readily accessible.2 It is mainly the ideas and theories of 
these leaders of .the legal world of the eighteenth century that Lieber-
man reviews and resuscitates, especially as they related to the question 
of law revision that Bentham later pursued with such astonishing 
vigor. 
The first half of Lieberman's book is devoted to Blackstone's Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, 3 and to Lord Mansfield in his ca-
pacity as Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench.4 Then, as 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. 1962, Duke; LL.B. 1965, 
Stanford; M.S.B.A. 1967, Denver. - Ed. 
1. 11 w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISrORY OF ENGLISH LAW 630 (1938) (footnotes omitted). 
2. The same is true of the second tier of personalities treated by Lieberman: Bacon, Barring-
ton, Beccaria, Burn, Eden, Hargrave, and Madan. 
3. W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769). 
4. Mansfield held this office from 1756 to 1788. Holdsworth characterized him as "not only 
the greatest lawyer of the century, but also a legal statesman, who was fully cognizant of the need 
to infuse new ideas into the administration and principles of the common law, if it was to remain 
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bridges to Bentham, Lieberman presents a two-chapter exposition of 
the writings and philosophy of an influential Scottish judge, Lord 
Kam.es, and a two-chapter section entitled "Parliamentary Statute" 
(pp. 179-215). Lieberman's final three chapters and his conclusion are 
devoted to the years of Bentham's early maturity, in particular, the 
laborious analytical evolution culminating in the Pannomion, Ben-
tham's brief for the intrinsic superiority of legislation over other forms 
of lawmaking and law governance. 
In ms introduction (pp. 1-28), Lieberman describes his work as "a 
study of eighteenth-century intellectual history" that has as its first 
objective 
to recover an important contemporary discussion of the rival claims of 
common law and legislation within the English legal system, to suggest 
how this discussion illuminates more general and familiar themes in the 
political thought of the period, and especially to indicate the way in 
which questions regarding legal change and law reform came to be 
framed in terms of this discussion. [p. 2] 
This goal leads naturally to another major objective - "to advance a 
new account of Jeremy Bentham's earliest explorations in jurispru-
dence" and to establish "that Bentham's legislative science should be 
regarded not as the definitive ideology of law reform produced in 
eighteenth-century England, but rather as one among several ap-
proaches to legislation and legal improvement elaborated at this time" 
(p. 3). 
According to Holdsworth, the process of legislation in the eight-
eenth century, "so far as concerns the enactment of public and general 
statutes, was in essentials the procedure of the seventeenth century,"5 
that is, a stagnant process lacking comprehensiveness. Changes did 
take place in the private bill procedure, however, so that, through ex-
perimentation, "it was possible to introduce wholly new ideas into 
English law."6 Thus, Holdsworth concluded that "the number and 
variety of the private Acts of Parliament, which were passed in the 
eighteenth century, went far to supplement the comparatively small 
number and limited range of the public and general Acts."7 
Lieberman, however, introduces the work of P.D.G. Thomas8 on 
the eighteenth-century House of Commons, which reveals that the 
output of public statutes during the reign of George III (1760-1820) 
was sharply higher than the output of a century previous (p. 13). In-
deed, throughout the reigns of the first three Georges, 1714-1820, the 
adequate to solve the new problems which changing commercial and industrial conditions were 
setting to it ..•. " 11 W. HoLDSWORTII, supra note 1, at 463. 
5. Id. at 323. 
6. Id. at 323-24. 
7. Id. at 324. 
8. P. 13 (citing P. THOMAS, THE HOUSE OF CoMMONS IN TIIE EIGHTEENTII CENTURY 61 
(1971)). 
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number of public acts of Parliament exceeded the number of private 
bills (p. 13). Nonetheless, this accelerated legislative output was, by 
all accounts, undisciplined and uncoordinated, perhaps even 
incoherent. 9 
While legislation may have been incoherent during this period, not 
everyone viewed law as chaotic. Early in the reign of George III, Wil-
liam Blackstone completed his influential Commentaries. Here, Black-
stone displayed the law of England in a disciplined, coordinated, 
coherent way not previously thought possible. The Commentaries 
were a blockbuster. They became standard reading for young lawyers 
and educated gentlemen, 10 and, as is well-known, the Commentaries 
were extraordinarily influential in the formative era of the American 
republic. 11 
Richard Posner asserts that "[h]istory has not dealt kindly with 
Blackstone. Bentham's denunciation of the Commentaries placed 
Blackstone's admirers on the defensive ever after."12 Bentham's at-
tack, published in 1776 in A Fragment on Government made, accord-
ing to Posner, two fundamental criticisms of the Commentaries: "that 
Blackstone was a shameless apologist for the status quo," and that 
"Blackstone's analysis of the nature and sources of legal obligation 
was shallow, amateurish, and contradictory."13 In his article, Posner 
may overstate the extent to which Bentham undermined Blackstone; 
Posner himself characterizes Bentham's attack as "fundamentally mis-
conceived. "14 Posner argues that 
Bentham's hostility to Blackstone seems to have been rooted less in dis-
agreements over substantive policies than in Blackstone's forensically ef-
fective defense of a gradualist approach to legal reform that preferred 
common law interstitial lawmaking to sweeping statutory change and 
that emphasized both the capacity of the common law to reform and the 
high incidence of legislative miscarriage. is 
Bentham thought the "high incidence of legislative miscarriage" 
avoidable, and because he believed an all-encompassing legislative 
code to be feasible, its construction was imperative; a prescriptive code 
built around principles of utility would be vastly more efficient and 
effective than sporadic punishments meted out by common law courts 
against defendants who did wrong. 
9. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 98. 
10. Lieberman quotes, for example, Lord Mansfield's praise of the Commentaries as a text for 
legal education, where the student "will find analytical reasoning diffused in a pleased and per-
spicuous style" laying out "the first principles on which our excellent laws are founded." P. 35 
(quoting J. HOLLIDAY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM LATE EARL OF MANSFIELD 89 (1797)). 
11. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 88-89 (1973). 
12. Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 569, 570 (1976). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 569. 
15. Id. at 596. 
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Lieberman presents a lucid description of Bentham's critique of 
common law (ch. 11 ). According to Lieberman, Bentham thought 
statute law was superior because it "produced obedience 'by com-
mand,' " while common law, producing obedience by punishment, was 
"unacceptable" as "a system of legal management" (pp. 232-33). 
From this premise, Bentham reasoned himself into an absolute convic-
tion that every country could "exhibit a complete collection of the 
laws in force: in a word, a complete body of law; a pannomion, if so it 
might be termed."16 This conviction was not achieved easily; along 
the way, Bentham acknowledged that he had "found himself unex-
pectedly entangled in an unsuspected corner of the metaphysical 
maze."17 But once the conviction was gained, it was locked in for 
good. Posner characterizes Bentham's belief in a fully capable, indeed 
infallible legislature as a blind spot - Bentham "worried about all 
monopolies except the most dangerous, the monopoly of political 
power."18 
Lieberman, by contrast, does not directly criticize Bentham's 
views. Rather, he brings the reader to an understanding of Bentham's 
belief in the Pannomion and he leaves Bentham and the reader there, 
concluding his study. But along the way, Bentham, as Lieberman 
presents him, self-destructs. That is, Bentham's beliefs, as laid out by 
Lieberman, strike the modern reader as hopelessly naive and impracti-
cable. Surely most modern readers, especially those attentive to twen-
tieth-century politics, would reject Bentham's belief in the possibility 
of an infallible legislature, preferring the Blackstonian assumptions, 
"which alleged the inherent incapacity of human legislators to create 
satisfactory systems of comprehensive legal rules" (p. 282). The mod-
ern mind recoils from the notion that " 'such a degree of comprehen-
sion and steadiness' might be achieved by the legislator, 'as to render 
the allowance of liberal or discretionary interpretation on the part of 
the judge no longer necessary.' "19 
A fascinating illustration of the impracticability of Bentham's 
ideas is provided by Lieberman in Chapter Twelve on Bentham's "Di-
gest" (pp. 241-56). Lieberman wrests this little known plan for a di-
gest of the law out of Bentham manuscripts. The full notion is 
amazing, although it begins with the simple, appealing proposition 
that all law be first digested, and second, promulgated in a manner 
easily unde~stood by the people. The "digestion" phase required a 
thoroughgoing review and condensation of existing statutory law in 
16. P. 274 (quoting J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 305 (Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, J. Bums ed. 1970)). 
17. P. 257. This wonderful expression appears in J. BENTHAM, supra note 16, at 1. 
18. Posner, supra note 12, at 606. 
19. P. 278 (quoting J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 240 (H. Hart ed. 1970)). Bentham 
believed that judicial discretion could be dispensed with, although he acknowledged that "new 
cases would emerge which would lead the legislator to alter his enactments." P. 282. 
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order to squeeze out prolixity and perplexity. The next step was to 
encapsulate all of the common law into The Digest and to have all of 
these digested principles endorsed by Parliament so that they would 
become legislation. Then The Digest was to be promulgated by being 
broken down " 'into codes or parcels, as many as there are classes of 
persons distinguishably concerned in it,' and by 'introducing to the 
notice and possession of every person his respective code.' "20 
Bentham apparently believed that practical difficulties with such a 
formidable project "would simply vanish once Parliament was shown 
the way. All that Parliament required was a single specimen oflegisla-
tive perfection" (p. 254). As Lieberman explains: "These codes were 
then to be printed in the form of synoptic 'tables' and 'charts,' and 
'hung up at places wherever the respective Transactions to which they 
relate' occur" (pp. 250-51). Thus, in a manner that strikes the modem 
reader as a system of disclosures and warnings gone amok, Lieberman 
extracts from Bentham manuscripts the following "cluttered vision of 
daily life decorated by the utilitarian promulgator": 
Laws relative to Parochial Affairs should be hung up ... in every 
Vestry. Laws relative to Commercial Contracts in general in the [stock] 
Exchange ... in the Halls of the several Companies, and [in] the Compt-
ing Housing or shop of every Trader ... Laws relating to Travelling in 
general at every Turnpike House and every room of entertainment in 
every House of entertainment ... Laws relative to the internal economy 
of Houses to be stuck up in Houses .... 21 
Admittedly the world of late eighteenth-century England might be 
so encompassed, but even this is dubious. It is no wonder that Ben-
tham's notions for The Digest never came into completed or published 
form, much less to fruition. The ideas of codifying the common law 
into statutory form and promulgating statutory regulations in easily 
comprehensible form, however, were not foolish; indeed, echoes of 
these ideas continue to be heard in modem law or in the voices of 
modem lawmakers. 
But I have jumped ahead of the story. Lieberman's foil to Ben-
tham is Blackstone. I earlier referred to Posner's remark that "history 
has not dealt kindly with Blackstone,"22 and while history may not 
have been as hard on Blackstone as Posner suggests, nevertheless Lie-
berman is at his best in his rehabilitation of Blackstone by careful the-
oretical interpretation. Especially impressive is his reading of 
Blackstone on natural law and on equity. Lieberman emphasizes that 
Blackstone's historical approach to common law relied upon natural 
law principles, and later critics who thought that "what Blackstone 
20. P. 250 (quoting J. BENTHAM, A CoMMENT ON THE CoMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT 
ON GOVERNMENT 499 (J. Burns ed. 1977)). 
21. P. 251 (quoting Bentham manuscripts at University College, London). 
22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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wrote about the law of nature was unnecessary or inconsistent or even 
unintended" were simply wrong (p. 38). Blackstone embraced the 
principle that nothing " 'contrary to reason' would be allowed as law" 
(p. 45). This principle provided the basis for distinguishing the good 
customs and judicial opinions from the bad. The question of whether 
or not the principle that "what is not reason is not law" should apply 
to statutes was, however, more delicate. The notion that such statutes 
"were void in themselves and, as such, could be rejected by the com-
mon law judges ... received its most famous airing in Coke's decision 
in Bonham's case" (p. 53). But Blackstone believed in the supremacy 
of Parliament, and, consequently, he did not accept the proposition 
that judges were at liberty to reject unreasonable statutes. He glossed 
Bonham's case by acknowledging that the judges were at liberty to 
regard as void any collateral consequences that were "manifestly con-
tradictory to common reason" (p. 54). 
This analysis connects naturally to Lieberman's treatment of 
Blackstone on equity. For Blackstone, equity was "synonymous to 
justice," and "all the English courts enjoyed an equitable authority" 
(p. 84). Here again Blackstone thought that "what is not reason is not 
law," so that adjudged cases were to be considered as binding prece-
dents only "so far as they are accordant with the spirit of equity" (p. 
85). And, just as Bacon had said in the previous century, novel cases 
were to be adjudicated "on the basis of reason and principles of natu-
ral justice, and without recourse to legislation" (p. 86). Thus, Black-
stone believed "that precedents and rules must be followed, unless 
flatly absurd or unjust," but not otherwise (p. 86). 
The best place to explore the Blackstonian structure, as applied, is 
in the decisions of "the leading protagonist" - Lord Mansfield. To 
this task, Lieberman devotes three chapters. His justification for this 
attention to Mansfield is that "[t]he decisions of Mansfield's court 
greatly enrich our understanding of common law orthodoxy, particu-
larly in regard to the place of natural jurisprudence in common law 
theory" (p. 3). Lieberman disagrees with those who claim that Mans-
field was not an innovator; he characterizes "Mansfield's 'founding' of 
the commercial law as an inspired and instructive instance of legal 
innovation" (p. 124). Further, Lieberman emphasizes the many in-
stances in which natural law or equitable principles animated Mans-
field's decisions, causing Mansfield to be excoriated by Lord Camden, 
in the writings of Junius, and by others. This ground is fairly well 
traveled in works by Holliday, Lord Campbell, Fifoot, and Heward,23 
but no one has shown as carefully as does Lieberman the extent to 
which Mansfield's opinions reflect Blackstone's conception of equity. 
23. 2 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 302-587 (1849); C. 
FIFOOT, LoRD MANSFIELD (1936); E. HEWARD, LoRD MANSFIELD (1979); J. HOLLIDAY, THE 
LIFE OF WILLIAM LATE EARL OF MANSFIELD (1797). 
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Mansfield admired the Commentaries. 24 Perhaps this admiration 
was due in part to the role Mansfield played in helping to shape the 
section on equity, and in editing the first edition. According to 
Holdsworth, 
Blackstone's treatment of equity in his lectures is wholly different from 
his treatment of equity in the Commentaries; ... this difference is due to 
the fact that he had accepted Mansfield's views as to the essential unity 
of the rules of law and equity. His treatment of equity in his Commenta-
ries is, in substance, a literary summary of Mansfield's views.25 
Moreover, Blackstone, writing to Wilmot, attested to Mansfield's help: 
"Sir, Lord Mansfield did me the honour to inform me, that both you 
and himself had been so obliging as to mark out a few of the many 
errors, which I am sensible are to be met with in the Book which I 
lately published."26 Nevertheless, when Blackstone was on the Court 
of King's Bench with Mansfield, Mansfield refused to allow counsel to 
cite the Commentaries: 
A few days ago, as Sir William Blackstone was on the Bench, in the 
Court of King's Bench, Counsellor Impey availed himself of applying to 
that Gentleman's Commentaries on the Laws of England, and was enter-
ing into some observations upon that head, when Lord Chief Justice 
Mansfield stopped him short, and said, "he would suffer no such refer-
ences in that Court; for though the work alluded to was of much utility 
to the public, and would be remembered and applied to when the Author 
was no more, yet, while living, he thought it unnecessary, as well as 
improper."27 
While at the bar, much of Lord Mansfield's law practice had been 
in Chancery before Lord Hardwicke, whom Mansfield (then William 
Murray) greatly admired. This may have contributed to Lord Mans-
field's inclination to accomplish individual justice - to do equity -
whenever possible without harming other valuable principles or inter-
ests, such as the importance in commercial law of certainty. 
This inclination to achieve substantial justice is evident in Lord 
24. See supra note 10. 
25. Holdsworth, Some Aspects of Blackstone and His Commentaries, 4 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 261, 
272 (1932). This topic is treated more extensively in Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of 
Equity, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1929); see also Waterman, Mansfield and Blackstone's Commenta-
ries, l U. CHI. L. REV. 549 (1934). 
26. J. WILMOT, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR JOHN EARDLEY 
WILMOT, KNT., 71 (1802). 
27. Lloyd's Evening Post, May 18, 1770. 
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Mansfield's trial notes.28 In Delaval v. Lord Mixbrough,29 plaintiff 
sued to collect on a £450 promissory note given to him by Lady Mix-
brough with Lord Mixbrough's full awareness and apparent approval. 
The note was a second payment on top of a previous £600 advance by 
Lady Mixbrough. Both payments were designed to permit the plaintiff 
to buy a military commission, but plaintiff had squandered the £600, 
and in view of that fact, defendant refused to honor the £450 note, 
claiming that the note had been given by his wife without his privity. 
The evidence clearly established that defendant was fully privy to the 
note, and the jury gave plaintiff the verdict, for £450. Mansfield was 
uncomfortable with the verdict. In an unusually explicit comment, he 
spelled out his thoughts and his intervention: 
I saw Lord M had rashly & unguardedly swore that his Lady gave 
the Note without his privity. I saw the young Man had done very wrong 
in spending the 600£ & trying to deceive her by falsehood that the 
Money lay in the Agent's hands to buy a Commission. I exceedingly 
condemned the Plaintiff's having arrested Lord M. 
I doubted whether Plaintiff, having broke the Condition of the Gift 
relative to the purchase of a Commission in the front Regiment [of] the 
Duke of Glosters, & having otherwise misbehaved, had a right to recover 
upon a voluntary promise of generosity. 
Therefore to avoid altercasion & animosity, to pass over the Question 
whether the Note [was] given with Lord Mixbrough's privity, I piqued 
the generosity of the Defendant & supposed Lord M only meant the 
Money should be applied for the Advancement of Plaintiff, who was 
stated to have gone a Volunteer to America. The Counsel for Defendant 
came into the Proposition. We could not immediately fix upon a Trustee 
& therefore I directed Plaintiff to enter into a Rule not to take out Exe-
cution without Leave- of the Court. The Meaning of which is that the 
Court will see the Money is placed out for Plaintiff's Advancement. 
28. With the cooperation of the current (eighth) Earl of Mansfield, I have for some years 
been preparing a work that includes selected case transcriptions from the first Earl's trial notes. 
The transcriptions are grouped by topic, with each topic introduced by an essay describing both 
the state of English law on that subject, circa 1750, and the contributions made by Lord Mans-
field as evidenced in the trial notes. This two-volume work is in press and will appear early next 
year as The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century, a 
title in the STUDIES IN LEGAL HISTORY series sponsored by the American Society for Legal 
History (University of North Carolina Press). 
In referring hereafter to cases in the trial notes, the citation form is my own. The first 
number refers to the volume of the trial notes as designated by the National Register of Archives 
(Scotland), the "nb" stands for "notebook," and the second number is the page number within 
that notebook on which the case in que5tion appears. At present, the trial notes are inaccessible 
other than by permission of the eighth Earl at Scone Palace, Perth, Scotland. (The trial notes are 
unpublished. In some cases, accounts of further proceedings appear in the printed reports, but 
the vast majority are unreported. Most of the cases referred to in this essay, however, will be-
come available in my forthcoming book.) In the citations, there ordinarily will be a reference 
either to "Middlesex" or to "London." This indicates whether the nisi prius sitting was being 
conducted for the City of Westminster and County of Middlesex in Westminster Hall, or for the 
City of London in the Guildhall, located in the financial district of London. 
29. 478 nb 147 (Middlesex: 31 May 1776). 
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Plaintiff is to have the Costs in consequence of his verdict. 30 
At other times, Mansfield wielded or withheld the prospect of a 
new trial in order to achieve a just result. In Forbes v. Wale, Mansfield 
wrote: 
The Defendant's hand was proved by a Witness, but no Interest hav-
ing ever been paid nor acknowledgement nor demand though the Plain-
tiff said he account[s] for that from the Satisfaction of the Defendant. 
One of the Witnesses was dead. The Plaintiff owned the other was alive, 
& remembered the transaction, but they trusted the Bond would prove 
itself from its Antiquity. I thought under these Circumstances & this 
Disclosure I could not let the Bond prove itself, but I called upon the 
Defendant's Council & Attorney, as the Defendant was himself the 
Party to the Bond, whether he would dispute the authenticity of it, & if 
he did contrary to his own knowledge, the Plaintiff should be at liberty 
to move for a new Tryal & that the Defendant should pay the costs.31 
And in Farmer v. Parkinson, plaintiff recovered a verdict against 
an insurance underwriter, and Mansfield explained: 
Objection [was made] that this [is] an Insurance by Plaintiffs, British 
Merchants, of goods to come in a Dutch ship from Cadiz - which is 
trading with the Enemy & therefore an illegal contract. I thought the 
Point very unfavourable in the Mouth of Defendant & quite new. I re-
fused to make a Case or save the Point but left them to move for a new 
Tryal as they could. 
Plaintiffs are Dyers. The goods are materials absolutely necessary for 
dying & can only be had from Spain. 32 
Not infrequently, Lord Mansfield encouraged the jury to take equi-
table considerations into account in reaching its verdict. Thus, in Gul-
liver v. Cozens, a trespass action, Lord Mansfield noted, "I directed the 
Jury to take into Consideration all the Circumstances and upon them 
to allow the whole or part they thought equitable and just for Re-
pairs. "33 Similarly, in the insurance case of Green v. Butler, M~sfield 
wrote: "I told the jury that in estimating the Damages they ought 
equitably to consider what the Case would have been in respect of the 
Plaintiff if the Defendant had done his Duty and made a true Repre-
sentation for He ought not to gain by the Agent's mistake but be 
30. 478 nb 147. 
31. 462 nb 146 (London: 26 Nov. 1764). 
32. 492 nb 174 (London: 13 Dec. 1781). Mansfield's refusal "to make a Case" - i.e., to 
reserve the legal question for argument before the full Court of King's Bench at Westminster 
Hall - was against his usual inclination and was cleariy due to the strength of the equities in the 
plaintiffs' favor. Compare Burrow's description of Lord Mansfield's well-known statement in 
Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 882, 887, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617-18 (K..B. 1759): 
He said, he always leaned (even where he had himself no doubt) to make cases for the 
opinion of the Court; not only for the greater satisfaction of the parties in the particular 
cause, but to prevent other disputes, by making the rules of law and the ground upon which 
they are established certain and notorious. 
33. 465 nb 92 (Middlesex: 24 June 1766). 
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indemnified."34 
In addition to overt jury instructions, Mansfield could (as could 
any trial judge) allow his summation to be shaped by equitable consid-
erations. In Rex v. Goodall the defendant was found guilty of perjury, 
and Mansfield wrote in his notebook: "I summed up very tenderly 
and as favourably as Truth would permit for the Defendant from his 
general good Character and his Figure in Life ... but am thoroughly 
satisfied with the Verdict."35 And in Rex v. Filewood, after defendant 
was convicted of a public nuisance for placing rubbish in the street 
even though one of the witnesses admitted that it was his duty to carry 
away the rubbish, Lord Mansfield wrote: "I directed the Defendant to 
prosecute Lassels and bring his conviction before the Court, as a Rea-
son in Mitigation of his [Defendant's] punishment."36 
Lord Mansfield's tendency toward individualized justice can be ob-
served in two additional contexts. They are the handling of precedent, 
and statutory interpretation. Fifoot observed that, although Mansfield 
found it difficult to "preserve the equilibrium" between principle and 
precedent, he nevertheless "observed the accepted canons of judicial 
dialectic."37 The system of common law was sufficiently resilient to 
allow Mansfield considerable operating room, but he acknowledged 
the importance of precedent, often urging barristers to search more 
thoroughly for authorities, or doing so himself. If the authorities were 
unequivocally against his inclination, Mansfield would yield. 
In Rex v. Pedley, 38 for example, Mansfield was constrained to ap-
ply a rule that he later described as "based on wretched reasoning."39 
The rule was "that it is not felony either at common-law or by the 
statute in a tenant for a year, a month, or a day, to set fire to a house of 
which he is in possession."40 Mansfield complained that 
a man may do what he pleases with what is properly his own: but that a 
man, who has an interest no larger than that which I have stated, may 
annihilate the property of his landlord, is a doctrine, which, if the point 
were now originally before the court, I could hardly have assented to. 
But the question has been submitted to the consideration of the judges, 
and nine of them (all who attended) were unanimous; though Nares, J. at 
one time differed. The legislature alone can therefore now apply the 
remedy.41 
The occasions when the authorities mandated a decision that 
Mansfield thought inequitable were comparatively few. More often, 
34. 458 nb 51 (London: 23 Feb. 1762). 
35. 449 nb 2 (15 Feb. 1757). 
36. 457 nb 162 (London: 15 Feb. 1762). 
37. C. FIFOOT, supra note 23, at 201, 229. 
38. Cald. 218 (K.B. 1782). 
39. Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397, 399 (K.B. 1784). 
40. Cald. at 227. 
41. Cald. at 227. 
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Mansfield would be able to shrug off a disagreeable precedent by a 
close factual distinction, or by questioning the accuracy of the 
report.42 
Sometimes, however, a case was directly governed by statute. In 
eighteenth-century litigation, questions of statutory interpretation 
were relatively uncomplicated. Formal legislative history, to the ex-
tent it existed, would not have been brought out. Nevertheless, ques-
tions of legislative intent did arise. 
When Lord Mansfield (then William Murray) became Solicitor 
General in 1742, he also became a member of the House of Commons. 
He remained in that House until shifting to the House of Lords on his 
peerage in 1756. Thus any statute enacted after 1742 stood a good 
chance offalling within Mansfield's personal experience as a legislator. 
Mansfield, then, would have retained a clear view of the legislative 
intent, which he would articulate in later litigation. Thus, in one case 
decided in 1780, "the question was, whether the officers and horses of 
artillery were capable of being billetted in the same manner, as the 
dragoons and light-horse within the meaning of the 19th of the King, 
called the Mutiny Act," and "[t]he Court were clearly of opinion that 
they were, and argued; that though the act only mentioned dragoons, 
yet it implied the horse and man to be billetted; and, said Lord Mans-
field, man and horse are one person within the meaning of the act."43 
Occasionally, Mansfield's awareness of the legislative intent pre-
vented him from reaching what he regarded as the just result. An 
example occurred in Crigan v. Maddock, a settlement case reported in 
1781.44 Two paupers had been married at a chapel in Northfield in 
1765 after the publication of banns, 45 and were therefore declared at 
the quarter sessions to be legally settled in Northfield. It was argued 
at King's Bench, however, that because the chapel had been con-
structed after the passage of the Marriage Act, the marriage in ques-
tion would not qualify. The Marriage Act recognized only marriages 
42. I do not here take up the problems caused by the lack of official reports of cases or of 
compilations of statutes. These problems were nevertheless real and large, as Lieberman notes. 
Pp. 89, 236-37; see also 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 303-15; 12 w. HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 1, at 101-62. 
43. Case ofWillan, London Courant, June 3, 1780, at 3, col. 4 (K..B. 1780). The author of 
the newspaper report dryly added, "According to this argument the centaur is not longer 
fabulous and comes within the meaning of the Act." London Courant, June 3, 1780, at 3, col. 4. 
44. Morning Chronicle, May 24, 1781, at 3, col. 3 (K..B. 1781). Brief notes of arguments of 
counsel and of Mansfield's opinion are in the Dampier MSS, Lincoln's Inn Library, BPB Bundle 
113-42. 
45. The term "banns" refers to "banns of marriage," that is, "a proclamation in church of an 
intended marriage." 1 J. BURKE, Jowrrr's DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 185 (1977). The 
tradition required publication in church on three successive Sundays or Holy Days. According 
to Lord Hardwiche's Act, commonly referred to as "the Marriage Act,", publication was to 
occur "during the ... morning service, or ..• evening service []if there [was] no morning service 
••• immediately after the second lesson .... " An act for the better preventing of clandestine 
marriages, 1753, 26 Geo. 2, c. 33. 
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solemnized at places where banns had usually been published, which 
could not be true of a chapel constructed after the Act was passed. 
Lord Mansfield, after musing about one of the abuses during the time 
he had been Attorney General that had given rise to the Act (the Min-
ister of the Savoy "who used to marry about 1400 couple in a year, 900 
of whom were generally women with child"), said that the Act could 
not apply to new chapels, and therefore the marriage in question was 
void. Mansfield "hinted at the propriety of a parliamentary interposi-
tion, to rectify the many marriages, which have been had, in chapels so 
circumstanced. "46 
When construing statutes passed before he was a legislator, Mans-
field was not constrained by personal recollection of legislative intent. 
Mansfield was, on occasion, prepared to endorse a meticulous, literal 
construction requiring stringent proof to establish a violation, when he 
concluded that a statute or collection of statutes was inappropriately 
mean-spirited and worked fundamental injustice.47 
Critics of Lord Mansfield thought his chancellor-like behavior in-
appropriate for a common law judge, especially where novel questions 
were presented. As Lieberman points out (pp. 97-98), Lord Camden, 
in parliamentary debate concerning the famous copyright decision of 
Millar v. Taylor, observed: 
Who has a right to decide these new cases, if there is no other rule to 
m~ure by, but moral fitness and equitable right? Not the judges of the 
common law, I am sure. Their business is to tell the suitor how the law 
stands, not how it ought to be; otherwise each judge would have a dis-
tinct tribunal in his own breast, the decisions of which would be as irreg-
ular and uncertain and various as the minds and tempers of mankind. 
As it is, we find that they do not always agree; but what would it be, 
where the rule of right would always be the private opinion of the judge 
as to the moral fitness and convenience of the claim?4B 
Whether or not he practiced it, Mansfield understood the point. In 
Rex v. Barberton, he wrote: 
If the justices of the peace at their sessions, or even out of sessions, 
are to be erected into chancellors, it cannot but happen but that on the 
same facts very different decisions must be made. Honest and good men, 
when left to decide secundum discretionem boni viri, must and will vary 
in their sentiments. Such a rule therefore would be highly inconvenient, 
and indeed would amount to say that there was no rule at all.49 
46. Morning Chronicle, May 24, 1781, at 3, col. 3. Parliament responded to Mansfield's hint 
in An act to render valid certain Marriages, solemnized in certain churches and publick chapels 
in which banns had not usually been published before or at the time of passing an act, made in 
the twenty-sixth year of King George the Second, entitled, An act for the better preventing of 
clandestine marriages, 1781, 21 Geo. 3, c. 53. 
47. See infra text accompanying notes 84-89. 
48. C. FIFOOT, supra note 23, at 226 (quoting 17 Cobb. Par!. Hist. 998). 
49. R. v. Harberton, 1 T.R. 139, 140, 99 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1018 (K.B. 1786). 
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Although Mansfield preferred an equitable approach, he also be-
lieved that there were more important concerns than doing justice in 
particular cases: one of these was the need for certainty in specific 
contexts. One context in which certainty was an overriding necessity 
was that of the poor laws - laws that Mansfield considered "a dis-
grace to the country"50 and which were involved in Rex v. Barberton. 
As Fifoot noted, "[t]he sacrifice of discretion was the more tolerable, 
when it could be urged to support the claims of common sense and 
humanity."51 
When Mansfield did exercise discretion, he was occasionally re-
versed by higher authority. A notorious example was the case of Per-
rin v. Blake, an episode that Lieberman effectively recounts and 
analyzes (pp. 137-42). The case was a cause cele'bre. In 1849, Lord 
Campbell wrote: 
I tremble when I think how stupid my account of the affair may 
appear; but the lay gents should know, that it was not only intensely 
interesting when it arose, but that now, when conversation flags among 
us lawyers, one of us, to cause certain excitement and loquacity, will say, 
- ''Do you think that Perrin v. Blake was well decided in the Court of 
King's Bench?" or, "Do you believe that Lord Mansfield really gave the 
opinion, in 1747, which Feame imputes to him?"52 
Mansfield sought in Pe"in to give effect to what he viewed as the 
clear intent of the instrumental party, in this case the testator. But to 
do so, Mansfield was required to tread upon 
the celebrated rule in Shelley's Case, established in the reign of Elizabeth 
on feudal principles and on prior authorities, "where an estate of free-
hold is given to an ancestor, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate 
is given either mediately or immediately to his heirs, these are construed 
words of limitation, not of purchase, and he himself tajces an estate 
tail."53 
In Pe"in, the testator, William Williams, could hardly have been 
plainer in his will about what he meant; he said, "It is my intent and 
meaning, that none of my children should sell or dispose of my estate 
50. 1 T.R. at 140, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1018. 
51. C. FIFOOT, supra note 23, at 206. 
52. 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 23, at 437 n.*. Perrin v. Blake was.reported, in its various 
phases, at 1 Bl. W. 672, 96 Eng. Rep. 392, 4 Burr. 2579, 98 Eng. Rep. 355 (K.B. 1770); 1 F. 
HARGRAVE, CoLLECTANEA JURIDICA 283 (1791); F. HARGRAVE, LAW TRACTS 487 (1787). 
Campbell's reference to Fearne alluded to the assertion in J. FEARNE, EssAY ON CONTINGENT 
REMAINDERS (1772) that Mansfield, while Solicitor General in 1747, had published an opinion 
on the very will later litigated in Perrin v. Blake contrary to that which he himself subsequently 
delivered from the King's Bench. See C. FIFOOT, supra note 23, at 179-80. Fifoot describes 
Fearne's work as "remarkable" both for its "invective" and for its "erudition which defied the 
contamination of reality." Id. at 177. On Perrin v. Blake, see also 1 W. EVANS, A GENERAL 
VIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF LoRD MANSFIELD, IN CIVIL CAUSES 329-53 (1803); J. HOLLIDAY, 
supra note 23, at 190-209. 
53. 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 23, at 431 (citing Shelly's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 
206, 208 (Q.B. 1581). 
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for longer term than his life."54 But because Williams went on to give 
the residue of his estate to his son John for life, with remainders, ulti-
mately, to John's heirs and to the heirs of William's daughters, the 
rule in Shelley's Case came into play. This meant that John could (and 
did) consider himself to have an estate tail instead of merely a life 
estate, which he could (and did) sell, leaving the heirs with nothing. 
Mansfield responded to this as follows: 
[A]s the law had allowed a free communication of intention to the testa-
tor, it would be strange law to say, "Now you have communicated that 
intention so as everybody understands what you mean, yet because you 
have used a certain expression of art, we will cross your intention, and 
give your will a different construction; though what you mean to have 
done is perfectly legal, and the only reason for contravening you is, be-
cause you have not expressed yourself as a lawyer." My examination of 
this question always has, and, I believe, ever will convince me, that the 
legal intention, when clearly explained, is to control the legal sense of a 
term of art unwarily used by the testator. ss 
According to Campbell, "[t]he universal opinion oflawyers now is, 
that Perrin v. Blake should at once have been determined in conform-
ity to this rule [in Shelley's Case], which had long been acquiesced in 
and acted upon," but Mansfield, misled, perhaps, by "an excessive de-
sire of preferring what he considered principle to authority," ruled 
otherwise.s6 This decision was reversed by Exchequer Chamber, with 
Mr. Justice Blackstone playing a leading part.57 
The case was prolonged and divisive, both on the Court of King's 
Bench and in the public press, the latter because of the name-calling 
that erupted between Mansfield and conveyancer Charles Feame.ss 
At the end of the near-seven years of Mansfield's personal involvement 
with the case, s9 he must have been left by it exhausted and dispirited. 
According to Fifoot, "Lord Mansfield's repulse in Pe"in v. Blake was 
decisive. Submission on so cardinal an issue involved retreat upon the 
whole front of real property."60 
As Perrin itself demonstrated, however, Mansfield was ready to ap-
54. Id. at 305 (quoting will by William Williams). 
55. 1 F. HARGRAVE, CoLLECTANEA JURIDICA, supra note 52, at 318. 
56. 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 23, at 432. 
57. Astonishingly, Campbell asserted that "Mr. Justice Blackstone's argument on this occa· 
sion was so inimitably exquisite, that his reputation as a lawyer depends upon it still more than 
upon his Commentaries." 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 23, at 433 n.t. 
58. Fearne accused Mansfield of having given in 1747, while Mansfield (then Murray) wns 
Solicitor General, advice to Williams that was exactly the opposite of Mansfield's opinion in 
Perrin. See supra note 52. Mansfield denied this, and after his death, his biographer Holliday 
produced new evidence on Mansfield's side of the argument. See J. HOLLIDAY, supra note 23, at 
200-04. 
59. Overall, the case lasted twenty years, from 1758 to 1777. Mansfield's role extended from 
1765 to 1772. 
60. C. FIFOOT, supra note 23, at 181. 
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ply his revisionist hand even to the sacred law of real property, 
notwithstanding Blackstone's admonition that "[t]he law of real prop-
erty in this country is now formed into a fine artificial system, full of 
unseen connections and nice dependencies, and he that breaks one link 
of the chain endangers the dissolution of the whole."61 Mansfield once 
acknowledged that he formed his system of "the general law of prop-
erty" around the work of Lord Hardwicke, 62 who believed that "[i]n 
the administration of trusts the language of the testator should receive 
a liberal interpretation and the rule in Shelley's Case be applied with 
discretion. "63 
Manfield's desire to give effect to the evident intent of the testator 
was not limited to the rule in Shelley's Case,· he also was prepared to 
relax the formal prerequisites for validating wills where rigid obser-
vance of them would frustrate the obvious intent of the testator. In 
the same year as Manfield's first encounter with Perrin v. Blake (1765), 
he decided Bond v. Seawell 64 In Bond, the issue was whether or not a 
will was properly witnessed when only the last page may have been in 
the room with the witnesses. Mansfield declared that "[e]very pre-
sumption ought to be made by a jury, in favour of such a will, when 
there is no doubt of the testator's intention."65 
Another well-known example of Mansfield's wish to give effect to a 
testator's clear intention in the face of formal irregularities was the 
1757 case Wyndham v. Chetwynd, 66 a decision that brought Mansfield 
into conflict with Lord Camden while Camden was Chief Justice of 
the Court of Common Pleas. In Wyndham, the question presented 
was the degree of disinterestedness required by the Statute of Frauds 
of witnesses to a will. The Statute required attestation by two credible 
witnesses. Mansfield held that the word "credible" was not synony-
mous with "competent," and that if the subscribing witnesses became 
disinterested before the time of the testator's death, their attestations 
61. Id. at 159 n.2 (quoting Justice Blackstone, in Perrin v. Blake in the Exchequer Chamber 
(1772), quoted in F. HARGRAVE, LAW TRACTS, supra note 52, at 487). 
62. Letter from Mansfield to Hardwicke, Dec. 10, 1758. British Library, Add. MSS 35,595, 
f. 312. 
63. C. FlFOOT, supra note 23, at 168 (noting Lord Hardwicke, in Bagshaw v. Spencer, 1 Yes. 
Sen. 142, 2 Atk. 246, 570, 26 Eng. Rep. 552, 741 (Ch. 1748)). 
64. 460 nb 102, 3 Burr. 1773, 96 Eng. Rep. 1092 (K..B. 1765). 
65. 3 Burr. at 1775, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1093 (emphasis omitted). The trial notes reveal the 
testimony of three witnesses, Harvey, Vaughan, and Leland, who testified that the testator de-
clared the contents of the will to contain his intention; moreover, two of the witnesses (Vaughan 
and Leland) indicated that both sheets of the will were present when they witnessed. In the 
reported opinion by Burrow, however, Mansfield observed that "upon a special verdict, nothing 
can be presumed." A new trial was ordered, in which the jury was to be instructed to "presume, 
from the circumstances proved, 'that the will was in the room.'" 3 Burr. at 1776, 97 Eng. Rep. 
at 1093 (emphasis omitted). 
66. 1Burr.414, 96 Eng. Rep. 53 (K..B. 1757). Other reports of the case appear at 1 Bl. W. 95 
and 2 Keny. 121. 
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were valid. 67 
The conflict between Lord Camden and Mansfield about Mans-
field's opinion in Wyndham came in 1765 in Doe & Hindson v. Ker-
sey. 68 Alone in dissent, Camden delivered a lengthy opinion criticizing 
Mansfield's views. Camden's opinion was scholarly, exhaustive, and 
although tinged with pedantry and antagonism to Mansfield, undenia-
bly forceful in its attack upon judicial discretion and Roman Law. 
Camden wrote that "it is not my Business to decide Cases by my own 
Rule of Justice, but to declare the Law as I find it laid down, if the 
Statute of Frauds has enjoined this Determination, it is not my own 
Opinion but the Judgment of the Legislature."69 He acknowledged 
that "I am very sensible that I am destroying an honest Will upon a 
nominal Objection, for the Interest here which I must treat as a seri-
ous Incapacity, is too slight even to disparage the Witness's Credit, if 
he could be sworn," but in his view, "[t]he Discretion of a Judge is the 
Law of Tyrants ... it is casual, and depends upon Constitution, Tem-
per, and Passion. In the best it is often times Caprice, in the worst it is 
every Vice, Folly, and Passion to which Human Nature is liable."70 
And as to Roman law: 
I am not wise enough to determine which of the two Laws is most per-
fect, the Roman or the English. This I know ... that although almost 
every Country in Europe hath received that Body of Laws, yet they have 
been with a most stubborn Constancy at all Times disclaimed and re-
jected by England. For which Reason, (and not through any Disrespect 
to the Argument [Mansfield's] I have been endeavouring to answer) I 
choose to lay aside all that Leaming as not being relevant in 
Westminister-hall. 71 
67. Mansfield's opinion occupies more than 16 pages in Burrow's Reports. Two of the 16 
pages are devoted to the disposition of the issue under Roman law authorities, ranging from the 
12 Tables to Justinian. See 1 Burr. at 425-26. 
68. The case was reported in full in pamphlet form in LoRD CAMDEN'S ARGUMENT IN Doe 
on the Demise of Hindson, & Ux. & al v. Kersey. Wherein Lord Mansfield's Argument in Wynd-
ham v. Chetwind, is Considered and Answered 39-91 (1766) (C.P. 1765). The case is also re-
ported in 4 Burn, Ecc. Law 97 (1809). 
69. LoRD CAMDEN'S ARGUMENT, supra note 68, at 50 (footnote omitted). 
70. Id. at 50, 83 (emphasis omitted). 
71. Id. at 91 (emphasis omitted). This view was shared by Mansfield's friend and fellow 
judge, Michael Foster, according to Foster's nephew, Michael Dodson. In his brief biography of 
his uncle, Dodson reported that Foster told Mansfield immediately after the opinion in Wynd-
ham was delivered that "[a]lthough I concur in the judgment of the court, yet I cannot concur in 
the reasons given by your lordship." M. DODSON, THE LIFE OF SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, KNT. 37 
n.p (1811). No separate opinions of the junior judges were reported by Burrow, Blackstone, or 
Kenyon, but Dod&on quoted from Foster's notes his reasons for his concurrence. Foster believed 
that the objection to the competency of witnesses based upon their being creditors by simple 
contract was novel, contrary to the spirit of recent legislation (See An act for avoiding and put-
ting an end to certain doubts and questions relating to the attestation of wills and codicils, con-
cerning real estates in that part of Great Britain called England, and his Majesty's colonies and 
plantations in America, 1752, 25 Geo. 2, c. 6), and inapplicable to the circumstances of the 
witnesses in question. But on the question of Roman Law, Foster wrote, 
When we are upon the construction of a modem act of parliament, and endeavouring to find 
the true legal sense of the terms which it useth, I cannot think it extremely material to 
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Undoubtedly Mansfield was unfazed by Camden's broadside in 
Doe v. Kersey. After Pe"in v. Blake, however, the fight went out of 
Mansfield on property questions. As noted by Fifoot, Mansfield 
"found it ever more difficult to uphold the claims of intention against 
the authority of rules, which had escaped from their original context 
and had assumed an independent and formidable validity."72 
While in Perrin v. Blake, Mansfield faced the problem of achieving 
a just result in the face of an entrenched, outmoded common law rule, 
courts also had to deal with another type of entrenched rule: the 
anachronistic or outmoded statute. Mansfield would undoubtedly 
have endorsed Blackstone's belief in the supremacy of Parliament. 
This is suggested by Mansfield's remark in Rex v. Pedley, above, that 
when precedents were too strong, "the legislature alone can ... now 
apply the remedy."73 Thus, Mansfield would not have thought his 
court empowered flatly to ignore or to "overrule" a statute. But as 
earlier discussed, 74 Mansfield often chose statutory interpretations 
that would promote an equitable or just result. Indeed Mansfield 
thought that the courts were, in the right circumstances, empowered 
to nullify outmoded statutes by strict construction. He also believed 
that there were constitutional limits on parliamentary interference 
with the courts. 
The constitutional point is illustrated by the case of William 
Parker, printer of the General Advertiser, who was convicted of sedi-
tious libel in 1779 for having printed a letter signed "a South 
Briton. " 75 Lord Effingham presented a petition in the House of Lords 
for the reduction of Parker's sentence, claiming that it was much more 
severe than sentences previously imposed on other printers. 76 In his 
speech supporting his petition, Effingham emphasized the tyranny of 
unbridled discretion, illustrating his argument with references to the 
history of Informations, as laid out in Blackstone. 77 After debate, in-
cluding a strong speech by Lord Mansfield in opposition to the reduc-
tion of Parker's sentence, E~gham's petition was unanimously voted 
down. Mansfield described the petition as "the first attempt of its 
inquire, what restraints the old Roman law laid on testators, at what time, and upon what 
principles, and to what degree, the ancient rigour was ab!lted, or what rendered the attesting 
witnesses competent or incompetent, or how far interest was or was not an objection to their 
competency. 
Id. at 40-41. 
72. C. FIFOOT, supra note 23, at 181. See generally id. at 158-97. 
73. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
74. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
75. R. v. Parker, Morning Chronicle, Dec. 22, 1779, at 2, col. 3; Feb 16, 1780, at 2, col. 1 
(K.B. 1779). 
76. See Morning Chronicle, Dec. 22, 1779, !lt 2, col. 3; Feb. 16, 1780, at 2, col. 1 (for reports 
about the petition); see also Morning Chronicle, Feb. 18, 1780, at 3, col. 1 (for part of Lord 
Mansfield's reaction to the petition). 
77. Id., Feb. 16, 1780, at 2, col. 1 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *308-312). 
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kind, the first call upon their Lordships to exercise an arbitrary juris-
diction over the Courts ofLaw."78 He distinguished the case from the 
normal process of appeal to the House of Lords by the Writ of Error, 
observing that "[i]n the present case there was no record, no proceed-
ings, no party, no opportunity of examining witnesses; in short, no fact 
sufficient to warrant their Lordships to take any one step whatever."79 
He pointed out that a petition for mercy was a prerogative of the 
Crown, and that if Lord Effi.ngham's petition succeeded, "[a]ll the 
convicts in Newgate, might just as well petition that House to interfere 
and procure them pardons, as William Parker."80 
To be sure, the Parker case relates more to the functioning of the 
House of Lords as a judicial body81 than as a legislative body. Yet it 
seems clear that Mansfield would also have opposed any after-the-fact 
attempt at interference with a judicially imposed sentence by the non-
judicial branch of the legislature, the House of Commons. 82 
Mansfield's belief in the power of courts to nullify outmoded stat-
utes83 is best illustrated by the way the Court of King's Bench dealt 
with statutes restricting religious observance by Catholics. Lieberman 
quotes from Mansfield's opinion in Foone v. Blount 84 in which Mans-
field argues that these statutes could be justified only because, when 
enacted, they were thought necessary to the safety of the state. Never-
theless, " 'whether the policy be sound or not,' these statutes had to be 
applied 'according to their true intent and meaning, [for] [t]he legisla-
ture only can vary or alter the law.' " 85 Thus Lieberman presents 
Mansfield's opinion to illustrate the proposition that "[e]ven the most 
zealous and effective defenders of the judiciary's proper powers to 
adapt and refine the common law as demanded by new social circum-
stances were careful to dissociate this capacity from an unconstitu-





81. Effingham denied Lord Mansfield's claim that the petition was a catl upon the Lords to 
exercise an arbitrary jurisdiction over the courts of law, observing: "He did not call upon their 
Lordships in their judicial capacity . . • . He merely appealed to their humanity." Id. 
82. In his speech on the Parker petition, Lord Effiingham cited the Titus Oates case ns a 
precedent. See R. v. Oates, 2 Show. K.B. 420, 89 Eng. Rep. 1017 (K.B. 1685). Lord Mansfield 
acknowledged that after the perjury conviction and sentencing in the Court of King's Bench, 
Oates had petitioned both the House of Lords and the House of Commons praying the interposi-
tion of both to allay his unjust punishment, but, as the House of Lords "alone were the supreme 
court of judicature," it was improper "to appeal to the other House of Parliament who had no 
power to interfere in such a case." Id. And, ultimately, Oates took the only step open to him -
to appeal for a pardon to the King, who held exclusively the prerogative of mercy. Id. 
83. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
84. Cowp. 464, 98 Eng. Rep. 1188 (K.B. 1776). 
85. P. 54 (quoting Foone, Cowp. at 466, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1190). 
May 1991] From Blackstone to Bentham 1655 
Mansfield's ruling in Foone v. Blount, however, was a refusal to 
extend a statutory prohibition against Catholics' taking land by devise. 
Mansfield rejected an interpretation of the statute that would prohibit 
the payment of debts by devise to Catholic creditors. He argued that 
even though only the legislature can vary or alter the law, "from the 
nature of these laws, they are not to be carried by inference, beyond 
what the political reasons, which gave rise to them, require."86 Fur-
ther, the propriety of strict construction of these statutes was affirmed 
by a consensus of the judges reached years earlier. In 1767, an Irish 
priest, John Baptiste Maloney, was successfully prosecuted at the Sur-
rey assizes and was sentenced to life imprisonment for "unlawfully 
exercising the functions of a Popish Priest."87 This conviction galva-
nized Mansfield into what appears to the modem eye to be extraordi-
nary judicial activism. A meeting of all the judges sitting in the three 
courts - King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer - was called, 
and in the words of Innes, "The fruit of this conference was an agree-
ment that all henceforth would insist on so rigorous an interpretation 
of the law that convictions would be impossible to secure."88 Mans-
field described this conference himself, stating: 
[A]s for the meaning of those statutes, I own before that affair happened 
in Surrey I had not thoroughly examined them. But since that time, all 
the twelve Judges have consulted upon them, and we have all agreed in 
opinion that the Statutes are so worded that in order to convict a man 
upon those Statutes, it is necessary that he first be proved to be a priest: 
and secondly that it be proved he has said Mass. 89 
Obviously not all statutes could be nullified by strict construction, 
and therefore Mansfield at times resorted to a call for legislative cor-
rection or repeal. Referring to the Statute of Apprentices, Mansfield 
once stated: 
In the infancy of trade, the Act of Queen Elizabeth might be well calcu-
lated for public weal, but now when it [trade] is grown to that perfection 
we see it, it might perhaps be of utility to have those laws repealed, as 
tending to cramp and tie down that knowledge it was first necessary to 
86. Cowp. at 466, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1190. 
87. P. HUGHES, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION 1688-1829, at 137 (1929). On 19 June 1771, 
Maloney was pardoned, conditioned upon his undertaking to transport himself for life (PRO/KB 
21/40, f.250; SP 46/151, f.63). It would appear from the warrant of Secretary of State Rochford 
that Maloney was tried before Mansfield at Croydon on 19 Aug. 1767 (SP 44/90, f.293). Mans-
field's surviving trial notes for the 1767 Croydon assizes begin on 20 August. Interestingly, Ma-
loney was not among the prisoners listed on Mansfield's certificate for the Croydon assizes as 
recommended for conditional pardons (SP 44/90, f.16). 
88. J. Innes, William Payne of Bell Yard, Carpenter 1718-1782: The Life and Times of a 
London Informing Constable 61 (unpublished manuscript) (no date (ca. 1980)) (cited with 
permission). 
89. 2 E. BURTON, THE LIPE AND TIMES OF BISHOP CHALLONER 94 (1909) (quoting J. BAR-
NARD, THE LIPE OF THE VENERABLE AND RIGHT REVEREND RICHARD CHALLONER 167-68 
(1784)). 
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obtain by rule. 90 
Similarly, Mansfield once observed "that, in his opinion, the bankrupt 
laws had done more harm than good, but that, such as they were, we 
are bound by them, and were obliged to submit to them, and in all 
probability ever will."91 Later, Mansfield complained of the bank-
ruptcy laws: "It is a pity that the Legislature should be silent, and 
should force the Courts, in order to attain the ends of justice, to invent 
legal subtleties, which do not come up to the common understanding 
of mankind. " 92 
Another technique that Mansfield may have used was to delay a 
trial until after an unwelcome statute expired. A statute of 5 and 6 
Edw. VI outlawed "forestalling," that is 
the buying or bargaining for any corn, cattle, or other merchandize, by 
the way as they come to the markets to be sold before they are brought, 
to the intent to sell the same again at an advanced price, or buying or 
selling the same again in the same market. 93 
This offended Mansfield's belief in free trade principles. Mansfield was 
said to have "revolted so much at the judgment which, under the stat-
ute, he was obliged to pronounce; that he ... let the matter stand over, 
postponing his judgment from term to term, until the statute itself ... 
had been repealed."94 
Of course, simply because a statute expired did not necessarily 
mean that its life was over. Mansfield's successor, Kenyon, was a firm 
believer in the regulatory ideas behind the statutes formerly outlawing 
forestalling and like practices, and he single-handedly resumed the en-
forcement of those expired laws.95 
* * * 
90. G. DANIELS, THE EARLY ENGLISH CorroN INDUSTRY 52 (1920) (quoting Manchester 
Mercury, April 3, 1759); see also Mansfield's opinion in his very first reported case, Raynard v. 
Chase, 1 Burr. 2, 6-7, 97 Eng. Rep. 155, 157-58 (K.B. 1756). 
91. Report of argument on a motion to discharge a bankrupt from prison, Lloyd's Evening 
Post, Nov. 22-24, 1773, at 498, col. 1. Another version of this argument appears in E. GREEN, 
THE SPIRIT OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS 275 (3d ed. 1776). The case in question is briefly reported 
anonymously at Lofft 341. 
92. Wyllie v. Wilkes, 2 Doug. 519, 522, 99 Eng. Rep. 333 (K.B. 1780). 
93. J. MONTEFIORE, A CoMMERCIAL DICTIONARY: CoNTAINING THE PRESENT STATE OF 
MERCANTILE LAW, PRACTICE, AND CUSTOM (1803). 
94. THE PROCEEDINGS AT LARGE IN THE CAUSE THE KING V. WADDINGTON, FOR 
PURCHASING HOPS, IN KENT 63 (1801). This story was told by counsel appearing before Mans-
field's successor, Lord Kenyon, about a case before Mansfield in 1772, the year of the statute's 
repeal. I am grateful to Douglas Hay for this reference. 
95. Printed reports of some of these cases are contained in a bound volume at the Harvard 
Law Library, Cases of Forestalling, Regrating, Engrossing, 1800. See generally Hay, The State 
and the Market: Lord Kenyon and Mr. Waddington, in PAST AND PRESENT (forthcoming). In 
the case of the statutes against forestalling and like practices it was possible to discern the date of 
repeal. Frequently, however, the duration of a statute was unclear, and courts coped as best they 
could with the uncertainty. For an example of some of the perplexities in determining the dura-
tion of statutes, see the tabular presentation of statutes on jury qualifications in the appendix to 
Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 211-21 (1983). 
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Lord Mansfield was easily the dominant judicial personality in 
England in the eighteenth century. His accomplishments and his in-
novations were many and they established the foundation upon which 
much of contemporary Anglo-American private law rests. Mansfield's 
approach was not broadly theoretical, yet he was a life-long student, 
and he was well versed in continental and civil law traditions. 96 He 
would also have been familiar with the writings of the group that came 
to represent the Scottish enlightenment. But, perhaps because of his 
political circumspection, Mansfield never allied himself with a reform-
ist school of thought. Lieberman recognizes this, and he turns to the 
Scottish enlightenment as a potentially fruitful way to connect Mans-
field and the Blackstonian structure with the radically different views 
advanced by Bentham. The Scot who best serves Lieberman's purpose 
is Henry Home, Lord Karnes. Karnes anticipated Bentham on utilita-
rianism but believed that the judges should be the instruments of 
change, not the legislators. 
Indeed, Karnes fits into Lieberman's exposition remarkably well. 
Karnes insisted "that law had to be studied as an historical subject," 
and he "marshalled his historical understanding of the law to the 
cause of legal improvement" (pp. 148-51). Further, "Karnes ap-
proached the matter of legal improvement . . . armed with two main 
philosophical doctrines. He was equipped with an ethical theory 
which indicated the need to promote the general welfare, and a theory 
of historical development which enabled him to evaluate the relative 
suitability of legal practices for a particular society" (p. 154). 
Karnes' notions of equity fascinate Lieberman and provide the 
most interesting connections between Blackstone, Mansfield, and Ben-
tham. Karnes embraced both "the principle of justice" and "the prin-
ciple of utility," but when the two principles conflicted, Karnes 
believed that "equity ... when it regards the interest of a few individu-
als only, ought to yield to utility when it regards the whole society."97 
Lieberman observes that Karnes' commitment to the dictates of utility 
led to a notion of equity that 
was extraordinary, if not simply bizarre. By so introducing "the princi-
ple of utility" into equity jurisprudence, Karnes had eliminated precisely 
that legal function which orthodox theories of equity served to explain. 
This was the judicial authority to grant exceptions to legal rules in those 
particular situations where their application would result in injustice. [p. 
170] 
Thus, "the Kamesian system of equity ceased to resemble equity at all. 
Instead his conception of equity as a separate body of the general rules 
96. See Rodgers, Continental Literature and the Development of the Common Law by the 
King's Bench: c. 1750-1800, in THE CoURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CoMMERCIAL LAW 
161 (Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History, 2, V. Piergiovanni 
ed. 1987). 
97. P. 168 (quoting H. KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 44, 47 (1767)). 
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of law which corrected by supplementing the historic common law 
came to appear remarkably like a program of legislative law reform" 
(p. 171). But "the reformers to whom Karnes directed the principle 
were enlightened judges and not scientific legislators" (p. 175). And 
the prime example of such a judge, whom Karnes credits as the inspi-
ration of his work on equity, was Lord Mansfield (p. 175). 
* * * 
After presenting Karnes, Lieberman inserts a final section before 
reaching Bentham. This section - Part III, "Parliamentary statute" 
- does not fully meet the promise of its title. It is comprised of two 
chapters, one on statute consolidation, the other on penal law reform. 
Both chapters are interesting, but they mainly serve as more stage-
setting for Bentham. Lieberman identifies eighteenth-century statute 
consolidation efforts as extensions of a comparable idea advanced by 
Bacon a century before. The notion was one of housecleaning- clari-
fying, sloughing off obsolescence, condensing. But "parliament was 
not to meddle with the common law" (p. 189). Moreover, "the pro-
gram was entirely backward-looking. Law reform was to be secured 
by having parliament correct by contracting and ordering the results 
of its previous legislative practice, not by enlarging its legislative ambi-
tions" (p. 197). And, similar to the notions of Karnes, the judges were 
in the best position to be the statute consolidators. This point was 
stated plainly by Hale in the seventeenth century and, to the eight-
eenth- century writers, it had not lost its force (pp. 197-98). 
Here, Lieberman would have done well to reconnect to Lord 
Hardwicke's speech to the House of Lords in 1756. Lieberman cites 
the speech three times (pp. 14, 17, 28), but does not give details. 
Holdsworth sets out almost the entire speech, revealing that one of 
Hardwicke's chief points was the role once played by the judges in 
legislative drafting. Hardwicke stated: 
In old times almost all the laws which were designed to be public Acts, 
and to continue as the standing laws of this kingdom, were first moved 
for, drawn up, and passed, in this House, where we have the learned 
judges always attending, and ready to give us their advice and assistance. 
From their knowledge and experiences they must be allowed to be the 
best able to tell, whether any grievance complained of proceeds from a 
non-execution of the laws in being, and whether it be of such a nature as 
may be redressed by a new law. In the former case, a new law must 
always be unnecessary, and in the latter it must be ridiculous ..... But 
this method seems now to be quite altered: every member of the other 
House takes upon him to be a legislator, and almost every new law is 
first drawn up and passed in the other House, so that we have little else 
to do, especially towards the end of the session, but to read over and 
consent to the new laws they have made: nay some of them are sent up 
so late in the session that we have hardly time to read them over, and 
consider whether we shall consent or not, which is remarkably the case 
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with respect to the Bill now under consideration (the militia bill) .... 
But this is far from being the only inconvenience: the other House by 
their being so numerous, and by their being destitute of the advice and 
assistance of the judges, are too apt to pass laws, which are either unnec-
essary or ridiculous, and almost every law they pass stands in need of 
some new law for explaining and amending it: and we in this House 
either through complaisance, or through want of time, are but too apt to 
give our consent, often without any amendment. 98 
In 1758, Hardwicke "induced the House of Lords to act upon his 
views," and the judges were consulted on a proposed Habeas Corpus 
bill. 99 The responses of the judges led to the rejection of the bill. 
Although there were other instances of consultation of the judges, 
Holdsworth was probably correct in observing that "the periods to 
which Hardwicke was looking back were gone beyond recall. Neither 
the executive government, nor a fortiori the judges, could then hope to 
resume that control over legislation, and therefore over the drafting of 
legislation, which they had once had."100 Thus, "[m]atters were al-
lowed to drift" - to await the brilliant, vitriolic pen of Jeremy 
Bentham.101 
The remainder of Lieberman's book is devoted to the years during 
which Bentham formulated his theories about legislation. These I 
have already discussed.102 
* * * 
David Lieberman has performed a valuable service by publishing 
his study of eighteenth-century legislative theory in Britain. Yet the 
work has some sense of being cobbled together in order to make a set 
of fresh and interesting points, so that it is not as broadly explanatory 
as one might like. As I have noted, for example, Karnes' views fit 
neatly into the span from Blackstone to Bentham because Karnes fa-
vored a utilitarian view of justice that was to be articulated and ap-
plied by the judges.103 But we are told little about how typical, 
unique, or influential Karnes' views were among the Scottish enlight-
enment figures or among their admirers in England. 
Lieberman has, however, linked important eighteenth-century 
98. 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 374 (quoting 15 Cobb. Parl. Hist. 727-30, 735-40 
(1813)). 
99. 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note l, at 375. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 12-21. 
103. Compare, incidentally, Holdsworth's description of Beccaria, in 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 1, at 575-76. According to Holdsworth, Beccaria's famous Essay on Crimes and 
Punishment (first published in French in 1764, followed in 1767 by the first English translation) 
not only influenced Blackstone but also anticipated Bentham. Beccaria, however, thought that 
utilitarianism, instead of serving as a beacon for the judges, "should be the guiding principle of 
the legislator." Id. at 576. 
1660 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1637 
figures in a way not previously attempted, and he has done so through 
the unifying theme of legislation, a subject that was, before Lieberman, 
sorely in need of attention. Lieberman's book is part of a series called 
"Ideas in Context," and this phrase is an apt description of the 
strength of his work. 
